Can The COPs Win?

I watched ‘Guardians of the Earth’ at a film screening this week and I have to say, I was slightly overwhelmed. The film focused on the Paris Conference, or COP21, as the ‘last attempt’ to salvage the Earth after 20 years of failed UN climate negotiations. Whilst the film was almost distressing in its highlighting of the complexity and urgency of the situation, the reaching of an agreement left viewers with a glimmer of hope. However, this is not fiction and the Paris Agreement might just be a big hint of the proactive international governance I was discussing in relation to the Arctic. As I said last week, I’ll therefore be having a look at what exactly COPs are, the problems they’ve faced, and why Paris might just be different

Figure 1: The leaders of COP21 celebrate after the passing of the Paris Agreement. 

The COP journey to Paris has not been a smooth one. The Kyoto Protocol, for example, which emerged from the 1977 Kyoto COP, was heralded as a success by negotiators yet fell woefully short of fulfilling the aims of the UNFCCC. Criticism focused on the low emissions targets, with just a 5.2% average reduction below 1990 levels. However, not only were ambitions limited but despite legally binding targets, rates of compliance were poor. Take Europe for example, by 2012 only 8 of the 15 European Union (EU) countries aiming to reduce their emissions actually met their targets. Across the pond in Canada, the situation was no better, with a 25% increase in emissions compared to 1990 levels. Figure 2 illustrates this continuous increase of GHG emissions from most regions as a result of poor compliance, limited ambition and, as to be discussed below, differentiation in emissions targets.

Figure 2: Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions, presented by sector, 1990 - 2010.

To make matters worse, the Protocol was ineffective in its approach. It incentivised short-term emissions reduction over fundamental policy changes, leading many nations to focus on achieving the Protocol in name, but not in spirit. The EU’s 15% emissions reduction illustrates this, whereby achieving the target was largely due to the absorption of the low emitting states of Eastern Europe. 

It was, however, the division of the world into countries with emissions responsibilities and those without (known as Annex I and Annex II) that eroded climate negotiations, not just at Kyoto, but for nearly two decades. The divide led to a fierce debate over climate responsibility and embedded a culture of free riding into the international climate system. Developing countries were not obliged to reduce their emissions, allowing nations such as China to exploit the same rules that governed low emitters like Haiti. In the context of rapidly shifting global development, with developing countries now accounting for over 65% of global emissions, the stark differences in emissions obligations resulted in a global unwillingness to act. When combined with the top-down nature of the institutional architecture, the Protocol became divisive, inefficient and stifling. The open-ended scope of the Protocol then allowed for future commitment periods like the 2012 Doha Amendment,  thus embedding these institutional flaws within the international climate regime. As a result, subsequent meetings stalled and the 2009 Copenhagen COP marked a low point in negotiations. This was largely due to the continued support for the Kyoto Protocol amongst developing countries and the mistrust and tension this generated, along with inadequate preparation. 

It therefore strikes me as remarkable that just six years later, at COP21, the ambitious Paris Agreement was adopted by 195 countries. COP21 is perhaps most famous for the aim to limit postindustrial warming to 2 degrees, with an ambition to keep warming below 1.5 degrees. However, the agreement has made changes to climate governance beyond the 1.5-degree catchphrase. COP21 put an emphasis on bottom-up participation, togetherness and support by introducing a bottom-up ratcheting process whereby each nation submits increasingly ambitious Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) every 5 years. 170 countries have ratified the agreement, accounting for nearly 88% of global emissions, a marked step up from the 30% of emissions covered by the Kyoto Protocol (see Figures 3 and 4). 

Figure 3: Paris Agreement ratification tracker. 170 countries have so far ratified.
Far exceeding the 55 countries required for the Agreement to enter into force.

Figure 4: Map of countries that have ratified the Paris Agreement. Nations shaded in brown have yet to ratify.

The success of COP21 somewhat reflects the failures of Kyoto. Preparations began well in advance, starting with the agreement of the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action in 2011 and by the start of the conference 181 countries had submitted their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions. Alongside this, a paradigm shift in support of climate mitigation encouraged cooperation between states. This shift not only involved governments, but Paris was progressive in its wider opening to non-state actors, illustrating increasing recognition of the potential for market-based approaches to contribute to environmental protection. Additionally, central to the Agreement was the continuation of commitment to the US$100 billion Green Climate Fund, marking the acceptance from developed nations that substantial support is needed by developing countries to reach their emissions targets. Running alongside this, and of equal importance, was the move away from the stark differentiation in responsibilities that had so far characterised climate negotiations. The awareness from governments around the world that every nation must make efforts to mitigate climate change abolished the system of discouragement in favour of a structure based on trust and collective action. Whether President Trump’s announcement to withdraw America from the agreement will reverse this shift is yet to be seen.

The common critique of the Paris Agreement lies within this very restructuring. The price of inclusivity was legally binding agreements. Yet, whilst no nation is legally obliged to fulfil their commitments, the non-binding outcome was probably one of the only options for an inclusive agreement. I for one believe that the system deployed at COP21, whereby states will make their best efforts if they believe that other countries are too, can work. Regardless of my beliefs, the direction for climate mitigation has been set and evaluation of its success will come from the scale of implementation.